Posted By Daniel Greenfield
On October 22, 2012
While Obama stonewalls, more and more information keeps leaking out about the events surrounding the attack. And each new piece of information somehow manages to make Benghazigate seem even worse.
The latest tidbit is an interview with some of the guards from the Islamist militia tasked with guarding the Benghazi consulate.
The guards were members of the February 17 Brigade, a militia linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite being hired to guard the consulate, the militia members were apparently supposed to be armed and trained by the US consulate.
The State Department, instead of providing proper security, was using the consulate to train Islamist militia.
The February 17 Brigade had early warning that an attack would happen and the guards clearly knew that the attackers would not fire if they knew they were Feb 17.
One guard said that his team had received information on August 28, 2012 about a possible attack on the diplomatic compound from its unit (i.e. Special Protection Unit/February 17 Brigade), and that warning had remained in effect until September 11, the day of the attack.
Another guard said that on the morning of the attack, the consulate had asked the Libyan security unit assigned to it to increase the number of its security vehicles outside the compound to 10, and to send 25 additional guards – but that for an unknown reason, the consulate later cancelled that request.
‘Ali also said that an hour and a half prior to the attack he received a phone call from one of his friends warning him “non-specific[ally]” about possible demonstrations and disturbances in areas nearby. He decided not to report the phone call to the security team, but instead took it upon himself to personally investigate the matter.
Realizing that he remained alone and might be killed, ‘Ali said that he yelled to his attackers, “I am [a member] of the February 17 Brigade. Don’t attack me… don’t shoot,” and that he told them that he was only assigned to do work outside the embassy and that he had happened to be drinking tea at the main gate.
Ali’s entire narrative probably cannot be trusted, but it indicates that there was forewarning and that the ties between Feb 17 and the consulate and Feb 17 and the attackers who were members of a Feb 17 splinter group left the consulate vulnerable to infiltration and attack.